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 Vehicle Communication using Hash Chain-based Secure Cluster 
 
Abstract 
We introduce a hash chain-based secure cluster. Here, secure cluster refers to a set of vehicles 
having vehicular secrecy capacity of more than a reference value. Since vehicle communication is 
performed in such a secure cluster, basically secure vehicle communication can be expected. Secure 
hash clusters can also be expected by sharing hash chains derived from vehicle identification 
numbers. We are also convinced that our paper is essential for future autonomous vehicles by 
providing secure clustering services using MEC. In the near term, autonomous driving, our paper 
makes it possible to expect strong and practically safe vehicle communications. 
 
Introduce 
Recently, the proliferation of quantum computers has increased the possibility of threats of 
eavesdropping or tampering with data transmitted and received in wireless communications [1-3]. 
Naturally, these quantum computers will also be great threats to vehicle radio communications. So 
there has been a lot of research on physical layer security against the threats of such 
eavesdropping/tampering [4]. Researches to solve this problem are proceeding in two directions. 
The first is to use quantum cryptography to fundamentally block threats from quantum computers. 
Next, we will protect the wireless communication channel through physical layer security. At present, 
the research on the physical layer security is considered more practical. In the near future, 
autonomous driving is likely to be realized on the road. Autonomous driving basically assumes 
wireless communication between vehicles. For this reason, physical layer security will be an 
important issue in vehicle communication in the autonomous driving era. 
 
Vehicular Secrecy Capacity 
Physical layer security can be considered as a concept of allocating any one of a plurality of wireless 
channels to be radiated. That is, physical layer security will make very few radio signals to be 
transmitted to the eavesdroppers, or signals transmitted to the eavesdroppers will transmit signals 
that are completely different from those to which the legitimate sender is sent. As a result, this 
physical layer security ensures that a unique wireless channel is allocated between the sender and 
the receiver. Physical layer security can be considered as a concept of encapsulating any one of a 
plurality of radiating wireless channels, referrig to Fig.1. That is, according to physical layer security, 
there is almost no radio signal transmitted to the eavesdropper, or a signal completely different 
from the signal transmitted to the eavesdropper is transmitted to the legitimate sender. As a result, 
it can be appreciated that the role of such physical layer security is to allocate a unique wireless 
channel between the sender and the receiver. 
 
Figure 1: Secure V2V communication with PLS. 
 
In vehicle communication, for safe communication, the ophthalmologist proposed a vehicle 
communication using a secrecy capacity [5]. In general, the secrecy capacity is defined as the target 
channel capacity minus the eavesdropping channel capacity. The physical meaning of this secrecy 
capacity can be thought of as a measure of how well data is transmitted to the target channel 
without the threat of eavesdroppers. However, since vehicle communication in the real world has 
no knowledge of the existence of the eavesdropper and the number of eavesdroppers, the definition 
of such secrecy capacity is not valid. Thus, we define a vehicle secrecy capacity for vehicle 
communication. 
The secrecy capacity for the vehicle is defined as the channel capacity between the target vehicles 
minus the average channel capacity between the remaining vehicles, referring to Fig. 2. Meaning 
can be thought of as a figure of how well data is transmitted to a target vehicle. 
 
Figure 2: Definition of Vehicular Secrecy Capacity. 
We propose a similar secrecy capacity, vehicular secrecy capacity (VSC), which is independent of the 
existence of an eavesdropper. Generally, the eavesdropper may or may not transmit response 
messages corresponding to its channel information in response to a communication-initiated signal 
from the host vehicle. The response message includes channel information that goes through 
channel states, and this channel information may contain SNR values. A host vehicle may receive 
channel information from either eavesdroppers or legitimate vehicles. The VSC value is defined 
under the assumption that the SNR value of the eavesdropper is lower than the average SNR value. 
Using the SNR values of the received channel information, host vehicles can define the VSC as 
follows: 
VSC = log2(1 + SNRAB) − log2(1 + SNRXOR),                   (1) 
where SNRXOR =
∑ SNRAi
M
i=1
M
, and M is a number of channel signaling received during the unit time. 
B represents the target vehicle for communication, and i is the vehicle number, excluding the host 
vehicle. 
 
Secure Cluster 
We define a secure cluster for vehicle communication. Here, the secure cluster is a set of vehicles 
whose vehicle secrecy capacity is greater than or equal to the reference value. Each vehicle can 
calculate its own secrecy capacity for the vehicle. Each vehicle may propagate to surrounding 
vehicles via broadcast signals that the calculated secrecy capacity is above a reference value. 
Referring to Fig. 3, the broadcast signal is a next generation broadcast signal (eg. ATSC 3.0), and 
may be transmitted by multiplexing an emergency broadcast signal for transmitting an emergency 
message and a normal broadcast signal for transmitting data for driving a vehicle [6]. The core level 
signal is an emergency message and a signal for transmitting information transmitted when a vehicle 
event occurs. The enhancement level signal is a signal for conveying information for driving the 
vehicle. Such information may typically include driving information of the vehicle. 
 Figure 3: V2V signal using ATSC 3.0 signal. 
Vehicle Hash Chain 
In general, each vehicle has an identification number to identify the vehicle. We formed a hash 
chain based on the vehicle identification number. Each vehicle stores this vehicle hash chain. Each 
vehicle may disclose the vehicle hash chain value and the number m corresponding to the last hash 
operation to other vehicles when the vehicle secrecy capacity is equal to or greater than the vehicle 
secrecy capacity reference value for vehicle communication, referring to Fig.4. 
 
Figure 4: Generation of Vehicle Hash Chain. 
Verification of Vehicle Hash Chain 
Any vehicle that has received a vehicle hash chain value of another vehicle can verify at any time 
whether the received value has really been transferred from a legitimate vehicle. To this end, each 
vehicle can verify whether the published vehicle hash chain value is valid by determining whether 
the published vehicle hash chain value and the hash value performed m times from the vehicle 
identification number based on the hash algorithm are the same. 
 
Formatting for Secure Cluster 
Anyone whose vehicle secrecy capacity is greater than or equal to the reference value may disclose 
a number corresponding to his vehicle hash chain value and the repeated hash operation number. 
The vehicle creating the secure cluster may add the block to the secure cluster by receiving the 
number corresponding to this vehicle hash chain value, referring to Fig. 5. 
 
Figure 5: Formation of Secure Cluster. 
The hash chain information corresponding to the generated secure cluster will be sent to all vehicles 
forming the secure cluster. This will allow vehicles with secure clusters to share hash chain 
information. This hash chain information can be used for data transmission or reception as a kind 
of shared key. 
 
Data Transmitting 
The transmitting vehicle may transmit a broadcast signal having data encrypted with its vehicle hash 
chain value and hash chain information to a plurality of vehicles. 
 
Data Receiving 
The receiving vehicle receives the broadcast signal from the transmitting vehicle and checks whether 
the vehicle hash chain value is included in the stored hash chain information. If the vehicle hash 
chain value is included in the stored hash chain information, the receiving vehicle may decrypt the 
encrypted data using the stored hash chain information. On the other hand, if the vehicle hash 
chain value is not included in the stored hash chain information, the received broadcast signal may 
be ignored. 
 
Lifetime of Secure Cluster 
Secure clusters can define expiration times when initially formed. After this expiration time, the 
secure cluster can no longer be designed to be valid. 
 
Secure Clustering Service Using MEC Platform 
Computing offloading may be implemented using an RSU or a base station [7-13]. Secure cluster 
formation in vehicle communication may optionally be provided. Any vehicle can be provided with 
secure clustering services using Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) platform, referring to Fig. 6. That is, 
a vehicle user who desires vehicle communication with improved physical layer security may be 
provided with a secure clustering service using an MEC platform installed in a device such as a road 
side unit (RSU) at any time. Here, the secure clustering service may form a hash chain composed of 
vehicles having a secrecy capacity of a vehicle greater than or equal to a reference value in response 
to a secure clustering service request executed in an application of the host vehicle, and transmit 
corresponding hash chain information to the host vehicle. The host vehicle may receive or transmit 
driving related information to a vehicle included in the hash chain based on the hash chain 
information. 
 Figure 6: Secure Clustering Service using MEC Platform. 
 
Conclusion 
We proposed vehicle communications using hash chain-based secure cluster. Each vehicle may 
disclose the hash chain value to an external vehicle when the vehicular secrecy capacity is greater 
than or equal to the reference value. MEC platform can use this published vehicle hash chain value 
to form a vehicle hash chain and send it to each vehicle. As a result, each vehicle can be provided 
with secure clustering service using the MEC platform to expect more secure vehicle communication. 
Our research is expected to be essential for the future of autonomous driving and help to apply 
safe vehicle communication easily. 
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